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In the Shadow of War
OWEN FIss*

Teaching is a difficult profession. I refer not to the hours we need
put in, which are not so long, or even the pay, which I have always
regarded as generous, but to the emotional burdens we shoulder.
Like most teachers, I spend hours on end preparing for class. I
reread the assigned material, trying to identify the most pressing dilemmas within it. In class I address those dilemmas with all the force and
energy I can muster and try to engage the students in the inquiry. After
an hour or two, or maybe, I confess, a little more, I walk out of the
classroom, wondering to myself: Have I helped my students understand
the issues better? Have I stirred their imaginations? Have I enabled the
class to see the law for all it could be? I amble back to my office,
usually alone, full of hope, but uncertain of the answers to these questions. The void or emptiness I experience is shared, I imagine, by most
law teachers, and it haunts us in our quietest moments.
This symposium and the events surrounding it cannot fill the void nothing really can - but they help, indeed they help enormously. I am
thus most grateful to those responsible for organizing it, above all, Professor Irwin Stotzky of the University of Miami School of Law, and
Allyson duLac, Michael Huber, and their colleagues on the Law
Review. The many friends who participated in the symposium must also
be thanked. I have been moved by their willingness to take my ideas
seriously, even to the point of telling me, of course, in the most felicitous manner possible, where I went wrong.
Breaking with academic tradition, my family attended the meetings
out of which this volume grew and graciously sat through the presentations and participated in the festivities. As a result, the meetings turned
out to be a cross between academic conference, memorial service, and
Bar Mitzvah. As evident in my teaching, I have the broadest conception
of family, and it includes Lorraine Nagle, my secretary for over twentyfive years, who has brought a special warmth and decency to her work.
My sisters, Estelle May Ezratty and Ann Valerie Zeiger, and their families, have always been there for me and were present at the symposium.
So were my daughters, Caitlin, Emily, and Gina, and their families.
* Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Michael Gerber and Jamal Greene made
many important contributions to this Essay. I also wish to thank Stewart Rhodes and Sergio
Campos and the other members of my spring 2003 seminar on metaprocedure for sometimes
bracing but always enlightening discussions of the cases of most concern to me here.
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Like the children of all teachers, they have had a hard time sharing me
with my students and have always been slightly mystified by what I do
for a living. Somehow they managed to give me their love, each in her
own way, to which I responded in kind. I also need to thank Irene, my
wife. She has given me support when I needed support, pushed me
when I needed to be pushed, and told me when it was necessary to stand
up and be counted. She has been my muse.
Not only is Irwin Stotzky a true friend, but he is also an organizational wizard. He decided to hold the meetings, not in the law school
itself, but nearby at the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables. The Biltmore is
a magnificent hotel, originally built in the 1920s, and partakes of the
elegance of that era. It is a National Historic Landmark, set among
grounds and courtyards lush with palm trees and crowned by a bell
tower that is a replica of the famed Giralda of Seville.
The glamour of the setting added to the joyousness of the occasion.
It also introduced an element of unreality to what we were doing. Our
meetings took place on Friday and Saturday, March 21 and 22, 2003.
For two full days we were ensconced in the beauty of the Biltmore,
talking about issues of great importance to me and presumably to the
academics present - school desegregation, free speech, civil procedure,
the history of the Supreme Court. Reason reigned supreme, lightened by
the camaraderie among the participants and the presence of my family.
The world, however, was in a very different place. It was dark and
tragic. On Wednesday, March 19, only two days before, the United
States had invaded Iraq.
The war was on our minds. One of the panelists, Aharon Barak,
was unable to travel to Coral Gables from Israel because of the outbreak
of the war. His absence was a constant reminder of the events occurring
in Iraq. Moreover, all of us carried within ourselves the tragic losses of
September 11 and knew full well the significance of the ongoing war on
terrorism. We were also mindful of the war in Afghanistan. It had
begun in October 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, and though the Taliban already had been
ousted and the Northern Alliance had assumed power, sporadic fighting
continued, as did the search for the leadership of Al Qaeda.
Although everyone at the symposium was aware of these developments, they were not publicly discussed. Neither the Iraq nor the
Afghanistan war, nor even the war on terrorism, was the subject of any
of the panels or formal presentations, perhaps because the issues they
raised seemed far removed from my teaching or scholarship. Yet I felt
the need to break this unwitting pact of silence and used - seized? - the
opportunity for closing remarks for that purpose. For me, the Iraq war
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was a gross violation of international law and put into bold relief the
default in law that has so marked the post-September 11 era.
International law is a fragile enterprise. Based part on custom, part
on the consent given in treaties, and part on the actions and the processes
of international organizations, the authoritative character of international
law, both as a descriptive and normative matter, is always in dispute.
Yet the rules regarding the use of force seem clear. The Charter of the
United Nations, adopted by the United States and thus binding on it as a
treaty, prohibits the use of force with two exceptions, one for selfdefense and the other when the Security Council determines that the use
of force is needed to secure world peace.' The Afghanistan war may
have been consistent with the Charter, but this could not be said of the
war that had just begun in Iraq.
Although the Security Council adopted a resolution condemning
the September 11 attacks and in general terms affirmed the right of selfdefense, it did not in so many words authorize the United States to
invade Afghanistan either to overthrow the Taliban or suppress Al
Qaeda. 2 The defense of the legality of the war had to be based on the
right of self-defense. The United States determined that Al Qaeda was
responsible for the attacks of September 11, and that the war against the
Taliban in Afghanistan was justified because of the symbiotic relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
By permitting the use of force for self-defense, the Charter creates a
measure of unilateralism. Power is vested in an individual nation-state
to determine whether it has been attacked, who is responsible for the
attack, and even whether the relation between a state and some terrorist
organization, such as Al Qaeda, is such as to justify an armed attack
against another state. Only the strong are truly able to enjoy the freedom
to make these judgments and to decide whether in fact to use armed
force, as opposed to less violent and more targeted alternatives, in
response to an aggressive attack.
Law requires impersonality, so that the applicability of norms does
not turn on the personal identity of the subject, but every system of law
operates in a way that allows the rich and powerful greater enjoyment of
protected rights than that experienced by the poor and weak. Consider,
1. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as
it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.").
2. See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
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for example, the provisions of the Bill of Rights guaranteeing free
speech or the assistance of counsel. We may seek to enhance the prerogatives of the poor or weak in order to minimize the difference in the
experience of these rights, but such an endeavor is driven more by egalitarian concerns - everyone should enjoy the blessings of liberty - than
by a belief that these reforms are required to turn the First or Sixth
Amendment into law.
In the domestic sphere, independent tribunals, backed by the power
of the state, have the authority to determine whether an act of violence
that is justified in the name of self-defense fully respects the bounds of
that right. Such an institutional arrangement is lacking in the international sphere. This distinguishes the law of the nation-state from that of
the world community, but it does not mean that the United Nations
Charter and international conventions are not law. In the international
context, law consists of the norms and principles that a nation-state is
duty bound to respect and obey, and in the case of the Charter, this duty
arises from the solemn consent given to it by a nation-state. Those
aggrieved by an alleged violation of the Charter may not be able to turn
to an independent tribunal to determine whether those norms have been
fully respected; nor can they rely on some world policeman to enforce a
judgment of such a tribunal. But they can address the world community
and demand that it make a judgment for itself and, if appropriate, impose
on the party violating those norms whatever sanctions lie within the
community's lawful grasp. Sometimes the only sanction may be shame.
The responsibility devolves on each of us, as members of the world
community, to make a disinterested judgment as to whether the norms of
the Charter have been honored.
Understanding law in these terms, I venture to say that a strong, and
in my view, a convincing case could be made for the legality of the
Afghanistan war. No such case, however, could be made for the war in
Iraq. The invasion of Iraq was not precipitous. It was the product of a
long and sustained buildup, and in the course of that buildup various
defenses were offered on behalf of the use of force. None was persuasive. On occasion, the legality of the war was defended on the basis of a
series of Security Council resolutions. The first, adopted in 1990,
authorized the use of force against Iraq to eject it from Kuwait.3 The
second, adopted in 1991, imposed a disarmament obligation on Iraq after
it was in fact ejected from Kuwait and a cease-fire was instituted.4 The
third - Resolution 1441, adopted in the fall of 2002 - declared that Iraq
3. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
4. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
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remained in material breach of its disarmament obligations.5 It also
gave Iraq a "final opportunity" to comply with those obligations and
warned Iraq of "serious consequences" if it did not comply.
Warning of "serious consequences" is not, however, the same as
authorizing the use of military force against Iraq, either by the United
States or any other nation. It also seems far-fetched to assume that the
determination in Resolution 1441 that Iraq was in material breach of the
disarmament obligations imposed by the second resolution revived the
authorization of force contained in the first resolution, since that resolution authorized the use of force only to eject Iraq from Kuwait. Bent on
war, the United States sought yet another resolution to authorize the
invasion of Iraq. Once it became clear that it would not obtain this
authorization, the United States proceeded without Security Council
approval and invaded Iraq.
Unlike the Afghanistan war, the invasion of Iraq could not be justified as falling within the right of self-defense granted in the Charter.
There were no ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda. The administration
claimed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and that one
day they might be turned upon the United States or other nations we are
duty-bound to protect. However, the evidence supporting the claim that
Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction was thin; one year after the
invasion, no such weapons have been found. Even if the evidence were
otherwise, the concept of self-defense would have to be broadened to
include a preemptive war. At the very least, such preemptive action
requires that the feared Iraqi attack, against which the United States was
purportedly defending itself, be imminent in order to qualify as an act of
self-defense. Because no such claim could be made in the case of Iraq,
the concept of self-defense would have to be stretched still further beyond the breaking point - to sanction a preventive, as opposed to a
preemptive, war.6
The administration also claimed, all the more so once no weapons
of mass destruction were found, that it was intent on ending the tyranny
of Saddam Hussein and thus bringing freedom and democracy to the
Iraqi people. In support of this claim, reference has been made to the
use of force by NATO in Kosovo in the spring of 1999, and the precedent that it set for what has been called humanitarian intervention. This
use of force also lacked Security Council authorization. Because the
Kosovo intervention violated the Charter and the system of law that it
establishes, the status of that precedent as law remains uncertain. In any
5. See S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002).
6. See Neta C. Crawford, The Best Defense: The Problem with Bush's Preemptive War
Doctrine, BOSTON REv., Feb.-Mar. 2003, at 20.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:449

event, even if it were viewed as law, a crucial distinction must be made
between military intervention designed to stop large-scale ongoing carnage or a genocide in progress-the case of Kosovo-and the use of
force intended to topple a tyrant such as Saddam Hussein. Granted,
Hussein, like most tyrants, came to power through brutal and violent
means, but the death and destruction that war inevitably entails, followed by military occupation, can never be justified as a means of ending a tyranny such as Hussein's. Other less deadly and less destructive
alternatives always exist. The war in Iraq may have been within the
strategic or economic interests of the United States - that remains to be
seen - but it signaled a contempt for the most elementary precepts of
international law.
At the time of our meeting in Coral Gables, the Iraq war was so
fresh and so immediate that no judgment could be made as to how that
war would be conducted and what strains, if any, it would place on principles of law in the domestic realm. But the record already established
by the Afghanistan war and, more generally, by the war on terrorism
was disturbing. The USA Patriot Act, proposed by the administration
shortly after September 11, and immediately enacted by Congress,
vastly increased the surveillance powers of the government. 7 The
administration also subjected many non-citizens, especially those of
Middle Eastern origin, to relentless questioning. Some were even
arrested on the weakest of grounds and detained or deported.8
Most disturbing of all, the administration decided to treat prisoners
of the Afghanistan war in ways that challenge the authority, indeed the
responsibility, of the judiciary to safeguard the Constitution. These
practices touch on themes central to my work and central to all the
papers in this symposium, and more significantly, threaten one of the
most cherished and elementary tenets of our legal system. The administration adopted a detention policy that puts the rule of law into question,
and much to my astonishment, in a number of key tests this policy has
been endorsed by the judiciary.
Habeas corpus is the historic means by which prisoners contest the
constitutionality of their imprisonment. When the prisoner is being held
by the United States government, the habeas writ must be sought in a
federal court. On March 11, only ten days before we convened in Coral
Gables, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit declared in Al Odah v. United States that no federal
court could entertain the writ on behalf of a group of prisoners from the
Afghanistan war who were held by the United States at Guantdinamo
7. See Elaine Scarry, Resolving to Resist, BOSTON REV., Feb.-Mar. 2004, at 6.
8. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS (2003).
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Bay Naval Station. 9 The court denied them any opportunity whatsoever
to contest the legality of their imprisonment by the United States.
All of the prisoners were captured by or turned over to the United
States forces in the course of the Afghanistan war. Most were seized in
Afghanistan, some in Pakistan. With the possible exception of one, who
played no role in the court's reasoning, all the prisoners denied that they
were soldiers of the Taliban or Al Qaeda, or that they committed any
violent acts against the United States. They claimed that they were present in the region either for personal reasons (for example, to visit relatives or arrange for a marriage) or to provide humanitarian aid. They
insisted that they were improperly seized, sometimes in a sweep of a
village, sometimes by bounty seekers, who then turned them over to the
Northern Alliance or the United States. The Court of Appeals assumed,
as it must when considering objections to jurisdiction, that these factual
claims were true. Thus, although all were aliens - the prisoners were
nationals of either Australia, Britain, or Kuwait, all allies of the United
States in the Afghanistan war - the court assumed that none was a combatant or even an enemy alien (a citizen of a nation with which the
United States is at war).
The Court of Appeals viewed litigation challenging the constitutional validity of detention as a privilege, and limited the exercise of the
privilege by aliens to those imprisoned within the territorial limits of the
United States. It also ruled that Guantdinamo was not within those limits. I find it odd to view litigation of this sort as a privilege. More is at
stake than the liberty of the individual seeking the habeas writ. The
United States is a government constituted by law, and a habeas corpus
proceeding is a way of making certain that the government is acting
within the limits of the law. Habeas serves a public, not just a private
function. Accordingly, access to a court capable of granting the writ
should not be viewed as a privilege belonging to some individual or
class of individuals, but rather as a means of enabling the judiciary to
perform a solemn duty - ensuring that the government is acting within
the terms of the Constitution.
The circuit court also erred when it ruled that Guantdnamo was not
within the territorial limits of the United States. The limits of the United
States extend to the territories over which it exercises sovereignty, and
surely the United States exercises practical, if not formal, sovereignty
over the territory occupied by the Guantdinamo Bay Naval Station. Sovereignty means supreme dominion, and that is precisely what the United
States has in Guantdinamo.
9. See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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The Guantdnamo Bay Naval Station is a 45-square-mile area on the
southeastern coast of Cuba. It has been in the possession of the United
States ever since the Spanish-American War of 1898, when Spanish
dominion over the island was brought to an end. As a purely formal
matter, the United States was given possession of the territory in a 1903
lease (later modified in 1934), but it is a lease without a term. The lease
provides that "so long as the United States of America shall not abandon
the said naval station of Guantdinamo or the two Governments shall not
agree to a modification of its present limits, the station shall continue to
have the territorial area that it now has . . . ."o Each year the United
States tenders the rent, approximately $4000, but the Castro government
has refused to accept it for the last forty years. The naval station is
separated from the rest of Cuba by an extensive fencing system. It has
its own stores, including a McDonald's and a Baskin-Robbins. With the
exception of a handful of elderly Cuban employees, holdovers from
another era, who enter the base for work, there is no exchange between
the base and the rest of the island.
In support of its decision, the Court of Appeals drew an analogy
between aliens in Guantinamo and those held in some foreign country.
It noted that habeas proceedings in a federal court could not be commenced on behalf of an alien who might be held by agents of the United
States in a foreign country because the Bill of Rights affords no protection to such persons. It then concluded that the same rule should apply
to aliens held at Guantdnamo. Because I view the Constitution more as
a constraint on the government than as a scheme that distributes benefits
to certain privileged categories of persons, I question the premise upon
which the analogy rests. But even accepting that premise, the Court of
Appeals erred in overlooking a crucial distinction between the prisoners
in Guantdinamo and those held by United States agents in, for example,
France or Mexico. The alien held by the United States in a foreign
country may seek relief in the courts of that country and may invoke its
laws or even those of the United States to contest the validity of his
detention. To what courts might the prisoners in Guantdinamo turn if not
to those of the United States?
Al Odah denied aliens held in Guantdnamo the right ever to make
their case - that they were not soldiers but humanitarian workers or in
the region for purely personal reasons and thus were being held illegally
- in the only court that might have jurisdiction to hear that claim. Al
Odah created what an English jurist has called a "legal black hole.""
10. Treaty Between the United States of America and Cuba Defining Their Relations, May
29, 1934, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, T.S. No. 866.
11. See R. on the Application of Abbasi & Anor. v. Sec'y of State for Foreign &
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The court's position, I suspect, was not derived from a proper regard for
the notion of sovereignty but rather sprang from a fear of interfering
with the executive in the conduct of the Afghanistan war or, for that
matter, any war. A similar dynamic led the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, decided only two months before,
on January 8, 2003, to shield the government from having to explain and
justify its detention of another prisoner seized in the course of the
Afghanistan war.' 2 This time, however, the prisoner - Yaser Esam
Hamdi - was an American citizen who was held not in Guantdinamo, but
in Norfolk, Virginia.
Hamdi was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and at the time of his
capture in Afghanistan was in his twenties. He was seized by the Northern Alliance and then turned over to the United States forces. He was
initially held by the United States in Kandahar, then transferred to Guantanamo, and finally moved to the United States Naval Brig off the coast
of Norfolk. Like the prisoners in Guantdnamo, he was held incommunicado, but Hamdi's father learned of his detention and, acting on his
behalf, brought a habeas proceeding to contest the legality of the detention. Hamdi was not charged with a crime. Although the United States
held him as an enemy combatant, the petition filed on his behalf denied
that he had fought for the Taliban or Al Qaeda and maintained that it
was a denial of due process of law to detain him. Not everyone in
Afghanistan, not even every American in Afghanistan, is an enemy combatant. As the petitioners explained in Al Odah, some go for personal or
humanitarian reasons and may be improperly seized by the United States
or its allies.
According to the government, anyone who fights against the United
States stands outside the protection of the Constitution. He can be held
incommunicado, denied the assistance of counsel, and interrogated in
ways manifestly coercive. He need never be charged with a crime.
Some may question whether the United States can ever treat an American citizen or, for that matter, any human being in such a way. Before
even reaching that question, however, some judgment needs to be made
as to whether the person being held - citizen or not - is in fact an enemy
combatant, for that is the fact upon which the right of the government to
detain him hinges. Hamdi's status as a combatant - contested in the
habeas petition - is akin to a jurisdictional fact, and must be decided by
a federal court in its role as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution. A

Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA Civ 1598, para. 64 (U.K. Sup. Ct. Judicature, (C.A.), Nov.
6, 2002), http://www.baiiii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/1598.html.
12. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
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federal court must assume responsibility for Hamdi's status and hear
facts sufficient for it to assume responsibility for that judgment.
Initially, the government refused to respond on the merits to
Hamdi's petition. This was deemed unacceptable by both the District
Court and the Court of Appeals.1 3 On remand, the government filed a
motion to dismiss the petition and attached an affidavit that addressed
the question of Hamdi's status as a combatant. The affidavit was sworn
to and signed by an official in the Department of Defense named
Michael Mobbs, who was Special Advisor to the Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy. Mobbs did not indicate the sources of his information. He nonetheless declared that the military determined that Hamdi
had traveled to Afghanistan in July or August 2001 and that he thereafter
affiliated with the Taliban and received weapons training. Mobbs also
stated in his affidavit that Hamdi had been engaged in a battle with the
Northern Alliance and that he was taken into custody, with an AK-47 in
his possession, when his unit surrendered. The affidavit described the
transfer of Hamdi from one prison to another, and concluded by saying
that interviews with Hamdi confirmed the details of his capture.
A hearing was then held before District Judge Robert G. Doumar
on the sufficiency of the Mobbs affidavit. In the course of that hearing,
Judge Doumar expressed his view - the basis for that view is not at all
clear to me - that Hamdi had a firearm at the time of his capture and that
he had originally gone to Afghanistan in July or August 2001 to join the
Taliban. Judge Doumar made no written findings on these issues and,
even more significantly, expressed no view as to whether Hamdi had
fought against the United States following the invasion in October 2001.
Judge Doumar believed that the claim of the government that Hamdi had
fought against the United States was still very much in dispute, and
ruled that some kind of hearing on that issue was necessary. He also
ruled that in preparation for that hearing, the government had to turn
over copies of Hamdi's statements and notes taken from interviews, the
names and location of all those who questioned Hamdi, and any statements made by members of the Northern Alliance concerning the capture of Hamdi.
The Court of Appeals would have none of this. In an opinion by
Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, the court held that the Mobbs affidavit
is in and of itself sufficient to establish that Hamdi is an enemy combatant and that no further inquiry is necessary. Accordingly, it refused to
allow Hamdi to appear in court to contest Mobbs's affidavit. It relieved
Mobbs of the obligation to take the witness stand, either to repeat his
sworn statement in open court or to be questioned by Hamdi's lawyers
13. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002).
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or the trial judge. It did not allow Hamdi's lawyers to engage in any
discovery whatsoever or to consult with Hamdi himself. Although the
Fourth Circuit in Hamdi went a step beyond the D.C. Circuit in Al Odah
- it at least took jurisdiction and required a response to the habeas petition by the government - it also repudiated the most elementary understanding of the judiciary's responsibility under the Constitution.
War is a perilous undertaking for all involved, and requires swift
and decisive action by those in charge of field operations. Some deference must be given to the executive in the conduct of war, including its
judgment as to whom to detain as a prisoner of war. This deference can
be reflected in the kind of hearing that is held, the scope of discovery,
and perhaps most significantly, the standard of review that is applied to
judge the government's action. The executive might be required to
show only, as the government itself proposed, that there is some evidence for detaining the individual as an enemy combatant. However,
the Fourth Circuit specifically rejected even this lax standard of review
because it presupposes some factual inquiry as to the prisoner's status.
Without such an inquiry, it is impossible to determine whether there is
any evidence to detain the prisoner.
Although affidavits are often used in civil litigation, the Mobbs
affidavit could not be regarded as supplying the kind of evidence that
might justify imprisonment. Commonly, affidavits are used in summary
judgment practice, but only to show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, never to resolve a contested issue of fact. Moreover, the
party opposing the motion for summary judgment always has an opportunity to respond to whatever affidavit may be filed in support of the
motion. The affidavits used in support of a motion for summary judgment are generally confined to statements that would be admissible as
testimony at trial - hardly a standard that the Mobbs affidavit, in part
based on unknown sources and multiple levels of hearsay, could satisfy.
Similarly, although interlocutory injunctions are often based on
affidavits, such a practice is premised on the assumption that there is no
opportunity whatsoever to hold an evidentiary hearing. In addition,
interlocutory injunctions are strictly limited as to time - as a general
matter temporary restraining orders last for ten days, plus one renewal,
and preliminary injunctions are in force only for the pendency of the
trial for permanent relief. The Mobbs affidavit - seeking to justify the
continued imprisonment of Hamdi and sworn to by an official readily
available to testify - cannot reap the benefit of these rules, even by analogy. Oddly, the government proposed that its action be judged by the
some evidence rule, but because it stood entirely on the Mobbs affidavit
it could not have met that standard.
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Admittedly, the line between a highly deferential standard of
review - some evidence - and the position of the Fourth Circuit - essentially no review at all - may seem slight. There may be little difference
in outcome. Yet I believe that there is a fundamental principle at stake.
Under the some evidence standard, the executive is held accountable for
its action and the judiciary discharges its basic responsibility to hold the
government to the Constitution. Ideally, a court should make the determination whether Hamdi is an enemy combatant, for that is the justification the government offers for holding him and denying him the
protection of the Bill of Rights. At the very least the government's
claim should be tested in an evidentiary hearing. Requiring a finding
that there is some evidence that Hamdi is an enemy combatant would be
a step in the right direction. In contrast, under the no-review standard of
the Fourth Circuit, which makes the unexamined affidavit of a government official in and of itself sufficient to deny the habeas writ, there is
no basis within the law for responding to Hamdi's grievance and for
justifying his continued detention.
Chief Judge Wilkinson stressed that Hamdi was seized in "a zone
of active combat in a foreign theater of conflict." 4 This fact is undisputed, but it does not justify the refusal of the court to require a meaningful inquiry into Hamdi's status. Not everyone in Afghanistan, even
those with guns, fought for the Taliban or Al Qaeda against the United
States. Recognizing, however, that Hamdi was captured in an active war
zone does require a more precise formulation of the limits of judicial
responsibility, and an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of federal
courts does not extend to the battlefield. Although a person captured
and held in a combat zone can contest the legality of his or her detention
before, in the terms of the Third Geneva Convention, a competent tribunal, the tribunal can be a military one governed by military rules. A
combat zone is ruled by a military government. Federal judges need not
hold court in Afghanistan or any other battlefield. Nor can the relatives
or friends of prisoners held in a combat zone seek habeas relief from a
federal court sitting in the United States.
When, however, an individual is captured in an active combat zone,
but later brought and held within the United States - which I contend
includes Guantdnamo - then the determination of his status as a combatant can and must be made by a federal court. Off hand, this may seem
an arbitrary distinction, turning on the happenstance of where the prisoner is detained, but I do not think it is. Rather, it reflects the theory of
our Constitution. Although the Bill of Rights does not rule the battlefield, the actions of the United States are governed by the whole of the
14. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 459.
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Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, wherever the government has
absolute dominion. The task of the federal judiciary is to safeguard the
Constitution, and to discharge this responsibility it must make judgments about the facts and hold the hearings necessary for this purpose.
The contested issue in Hamdi and Al Odah is whether the persons
detained were soldiers of the Taliban. Put another way, the immediate
issue in these cases is whether the prisoners were enemy combatants or,
more simply, combatants. The Afghanistan war also brought into play a
distinction between two types of combatants - lawful and unlawful.
The distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants has its roots in
the early twentieth century and customary international law, and was
later codified in two international conventions - the Third and Fourth
Geneva Conventions, both adopted in 1949.15
A lawful combatant is the ordinary soldier engaged in an international armed conflict, who, once captured, is given prisoner-of-war status. The Third Geneva Convention provides that a lawful combatant has
no obligation to give any information to his captors other than his name,
rank, date of birth, and serial number. A lawful combatant can be prosecuted for any war crimes he may commit, but not for the ordinary acts of
war, for example, killing soldiers of a hostile army. Lawful combatants
can expect to be repatriated at the end of the war. In contrast, the protections for unlawful combatants, for example, members of an irregular
militia or volunteer corps, are significantly less extensive. The Fourth
Geneva Convention provides that they be treated humanely, that their
religious practices be respected, and that they not be tortured or mutilated, but they lack the strict protections of the Third Convention for
lawful combatants. Even the minimal protections of the Fourth Convention are not, by the terms of the Convention itself, available to prisoners
who are nationals of the party holding them.
At the time of the symposium, it was uncertain whether the unlawful combatant designation would be used by the administration in the
conduct of the Iraq war. After all, the war was only two days old. This
uncertainty lingers, especially in the case of Saddam Hussein, captured
by United States forces in November 2003. However, the administration
has not declared the prisoners of the Iraq war to be unlawful combatants.
A different policy was pursued in the Afghanistan war, in which the
President determined that all who fought for the Taliban or Al Qaeda are
unlawful combatants. 6 This decision applied to the petitioners in Al
15. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
16. See Press Release, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002), http:II
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Odah and Hamdi, and more generally, to all the prisoners - some 600 who have been held in Guantdnamo. Many have been interrogated
relentlessly, some for sixteen hours a day, and plans have been set in
motion to try them before military tribunals. The judges in these tribunals will be chosen by military authorities; defense counsel will be
members of the armed forces (those who can afford to do so may also
retain civilian counsel); and conversations with counsel will be monitored, presumably just for purposes of getting information about terrorism that the interrogation has not yielded or to prevent communications
between the prisoner and terrorist organizations.
The legal tests of the unlawful combatant designation have been
fragmentary. One test involved the detention of an American citizen Jose Padilla - who is accused of planning, on behalf of Al Qaeda, to
engage in terrorist acts in the United States, including the detonation of a
device that would disperse radioactive material (a so-called dirty bomb).
Upon arriving in Chicago from Pakistan on May 8, 2002, Padilla was
arrested under a warrant requiring him to appear as a material witness
before a grand jury convened in the Southern District of New York. He
was transferred from Chicago to New York, and counsel was appointed
to represent him. Soon after Padilla consulted with counsel, and the day
before his court appearance, the Department of Defense took custody of
him without notifying his counsel and transferred him to a naval brig in
Charleston, South Carolina, where he was held incommunicado on the
theory that he is an unlawful combatant.
Acting as Padilla's next friend, the counsel who had previously
been appointed to represent him sought a writ of habeas corpus in the
Southern District of New York. The government responded with an
affidavit once again signed by Michael Mobbs. This time, Mobbs's affidavit detailed the basis of the claim concerning Padilla's affiliation with
Al Qaeda and his plans to engage in acts of terrorism. As a substantive
matter, District Judge Michael B. Mukasey was willing to assume that
all operatives of Al Qaeda, even those who are American citizens, are
not entitled to the protection afforded to lawful combatants. According
to Mukasey, neither the Third Geneva Convention nor general principles
of international law confer prisoner-of-war status on members of terwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html. Al Qaeda is not a state, and thus
not a party to the Geneva Conventions. For that reason, the President decided that the Al Qaeda
fighters could not receive any of the protections of the Third Geneva Convention. The
Convention is binding only if both parties to a conflict are signatories. Afghanistan is a party to
the Geneva Conventions, and thus the Taliban, although never recognized by the United States as
the lawful government of Afghanistan, is covered by the Conventions. But the President
determined that the Taliban army did not satisfy the specific criteria established under the Third
Convention for prisoner-of-war status.
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roroist organizations such as Al Qaeda. They could be treated as unlawful combatants and could be detained indefinitely without ever being
charged with a crime. But he insisted on the need to hold a hearing to
determine whether Padilla was in fact an operative of Al Qaeda. In contrast to the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi, Judge Mukasey was not prepared to
make the Mobbs affidavit dispositive. The deference that the executive
properly deserved was to be reflected in the standard of review - once
again, some evidence. Judge Mukasey required that an evidentiary hearing be held on the habeas corpus petition and that counsel be given
access to Padilla for purposes of preparing for that hearing.
This order was first entered on December 4, 2002.17 By March 11,
2003, shortly before the symposium, Judge Mukasey found it necessary
to reissue that order. The government had not yet allowed counsel to
consult with Padilla. Defending its recalcitrance, the government submitted an affidavit by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, claiming that the total isolation of
Padilla for this extended period - he had already been held incommunicado for ten months - was necessary to cultivate in Padilla a complete
sense of dependency upon his interrogators and to convince him of the
utter hopelessness of his situation. The District Court was unwilling to
acquiesce to this demand - certainly an affront to the basic American
tradition against coerced confessions. Judge Mukasey once again
explained why Padilla had a right to present facts at the habeas corpus
hearing and why access to counsel was necessary for that purpose. He
reissued his previous order. 18
The government immediately appealed. On December 18, 2003,
the Second Circuit went one step beyond Judge Mukasey.19 It repudiated Judge Mukasey's substantive theory and held that even if the government's allegations concerning Padilla were true, he could not be
detained as a prisoner without being formally charged with a violation of
some federal criminal statute. The Second Circuit relied on 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001(a), which provides that no United States citizen can be detained
without specific authorization by Congress. Disagreeing with Judge
Mukasey, the Second Circuit held that the resolution permitting the use
of force to fight the war on terrorism - the resolution that had been
treated as constituting the declaration of war against Afghanistan - did
not provide the authorization required by Section 4001(a). Although
this ruling denied the government the prerogatives it sought by classifying Padilla as an unlawful enemy combatant, it should be emphasized
17. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
18. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
19. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
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that Padilla is an American citizen captured not in the battlefield but at a
Chicago airport and held in South Carolina. The Second Circuit's ruling
does not apply to non-citizens, or even to Americans captured in
Afghanistan or any other battlefield.
A second test of the government's position regarding unlawful
combatants occurred in the case of another American citizen - John
Walker Lindh - who was seized in Afghanistan.2 0 Unlike Hamdi or the
petitioners in Al Odah, Lindh acknowledged that he was a soldier of the
Taliban. He denied that he had anything to do with Al Qaeda, and the
government concluded that little was to be gained by interrogating him
in the style of Padilla, Hamdi, or the detainees in Guantdinamo. Instead,
the government chose to try him for various federal crimes - most notably, conspiracy to kill American nationals - and selected as its venue the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Eventually, he was allowed to consult with counsel.
In this case, the government deployed the unlawful combatant category to get out from under the principle that "it is no 'crime' to be a
soldier"2 - lawful combatants cannot be tried for ordinary acts of violence during military operations, but unlawful combatants can. Attorneys for Lindh denied that he was an unlawful combatant, and on that
ground moved to dismiss the charge of conspiring to kill American
nationals. The motion was denied. Lindh then pleaded guilty to lesser
charges - providing services to the Taliban and carrying explosives during the commission of a felony - and was sentenced to twenty years in
prison.22
Like Damocles's sword, the unlawful enemy combatant designation
and the judicial endorsement of it will remain over Lindh's head until
the day he dies. The predicate for the criminal charge was that Lindh is
an unlawful combatant. So if the plea agreement is challenged and set
aside, or if it is determined that Lindh breached his obligations under the
agreement and the government is thus freed of its obligations under it,
the government can pursue the options it originally had by virtue of
Lindh's status as an unlawful combatant. It can go forward with the
criminal prosecution for his combat activities in Afghanistan, try him for
those activities before a military tribunal at risk of execution, or hold
him incommunicado indefinitely.
Similar dangers are present even if the plea agreement remains in
20. See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
21. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 793 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942)).
22. Plea Agreement, United States v. Lindh, (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37A), http://www.us
doj.gov/ag/pleaagreement.htm.
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force. In paragraph 21 of the agreement, the government renounced any
right it has to treat Lindh as an unlawful combatant, but that provision
contains one notable, indeed astonishing, limitation. It permits the government to treat Lindh as an unlawful combatant for his combat activities in Afghanistan if, at any time during the rest of his life, Lindh
violates either of two federal criminal statutes. One statute, the scope of
which was enlarged by the USA Patriot Act, defines the federal crime of
terrorism; the other prohibits trade and financial transactions with a
nation against whom the President has declared a national emergency
and imposed a boycott. The determination that Lindh has violated either
of these statutes, and the resultant reinstitution of his unlawful combatant status, is, according to paragraph 21, to be made by the government,
not a court. Even after the government makes this determination, presumably Lindh cannot be prosecuted in federal court for his combat
activities in Afghanistan; under the plea agreement, all the charges other
than the ones for which he was sentenced were dismissed. But the government can pursue the other strategies it had previously agreed to forgo
- trying Lindh before a military tribunal at risk of execution for having
fought for the Taliban or, perhaps more plausibly, holding him incommunicado indefinitely.
In denying Lindh's initial motion to dismiss, District Judge T.S.
Ellis, III invoked the definition of lawful combatants set forth in Article
4 of the Third Geneva Convention.2 3 He operated on the premise that a
combatant who does not meet this definition would be deprived of the
protection of that Convention and treated as an unlawful combatant,
thereby receiving only the minimal protection of the Fourth Convention.
Actually, Article 4 of the Third Convention establishes several cat23. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. The pertinent provisions of Article 4 are:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging
to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members
of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.

(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the
conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory
is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such
organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:

(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;

(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or
an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
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egories of lawful combatants. According to Section 1 of Article 4,
members of the armed forces of a party to a conflict are, without anything more, treated as lawful combatants. In Section 3, the same rule is
applied even when the state detaining the prisoners does not formally
recognize the government to which the prisoners give their allegiance.
Four criteria are, however, set forth in Section 2 of Article 4 for determining whether members of a militia or volunteer corps not part of the
armed forces of a party to a conflict are lawful combatants. That section
provides that members of a militia or volunteer corps not part of the
armed forces shall be treated as lawful combatants if the militia or volunteer corps (1) is commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (2) wears uniforms or an insignia recognizable at a distance; (3)
carries arms openly; and (4) conducts its operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war.
Off-hand, it would seem that Lindh was a lawful combatant simply
by virtue of the fact that he was a member of the Taliban army. Under
this approach, he would fall within Section 3, as opposed to Section 1,
because the United States never recognized the Taliban. In any event,
there would be no need to make the inquiry called for in Section 2. But
Judge Ellis rejected this approach. He held that "all armed forces or
militias, regular and irregular, must meet the four criteria" of Section 2 if
their members are to be treated as lawful combatants, thereby obliterating the distinction between Sections 1 and 3 on the one hand, and Section 2 on the other.24 Not only does this ruling violate the express terms
of the Third Convention, but it is also at odds with the humanitarian
purposes of the Convention. The Third Convention seeks to establish a
general rule endowing the members of the armed forces of a party to a
conflict or militias that are part of the armed forces of that party with
lawful combatant status. Granted, a militia that otherwise would fall
within Section 2 should not be entitled to the benefit of Sections 1 or 3
simply by calling itself an armed force. But the responsibility is on the
court to determine whether the combatants in fact fall into those sections. It is precisely this inquiry that Judge Ellis failed to undertake.
When it came time to apply the four criteria of Section 2, Judge
Ellis did not make his judgment on the basis of what Lindh or his unit or
the militia of which he was a part did. Rather, he made a judgment
about what the Taliban army did in its entirety, and then applied that
judgment to everyone who fought for the Taliban, including Lindh. This
blanket approach compounds Judge Ellis's initial error - subjecting regular armed forces to the four criteria of Section 2 - for it does not permit
24. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 557 n.35 ("Thus, all armed forces or militias, regular and
irregular, must meet the four criteria if their members are to receive combatant immunity.").
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any distinction among the various units that comprise the fighting force
of a nation at war. Once again, such an approach contravenes the
humanitarian purposes of the Geneva Convention.
The evidence that Judge Ellis marshaled in support of his conclusion about the Taliban also seems questionable. There was no contention that the Taliban carried concealed weapons. Based on two
secondary sources, one a book published in 1999, the other an October
26, 2001, article in The Wall Street Journal,Judge Ellis concluded that
Taliban soldiers did not typically wear uniforms or insignias and further
that the Taliban army had no internal system of military command and
control. This last conclusion does not seem entirely plausible, but putting that concern to one side, the case for classifying the entire Taliban
army as consisting of unlawful combatants because they lacked
uniforms or a command structure still seems strained.
As a purely formal matter, the Section 2 criteria are stated in the
conjunctive, which means that by proving that the Taliban fail to satisfy
any single criterion - no uniform or no command structure - grounds
would be established for classifying the Taliban as unlawful combatants.
This wording, however, is derived from the fact that Section 2 seeks to
determine whether a militia that is not part of the armed forces should be
given the same status that the armed forces receive under either Section
1 or 3. But if, as Judge Ellis holds, the criteria are to be used more
globally, to determine whether members of any armed forces are to be
treated as lawful combatants, then it would be more appropriate to apply
the criteria set forth in Section 2 in a way that reflects the underlying
purposes of the Third Convention and a proper understanding of what
turns on the classification. As used by the United States, the unlawfulcombatant designation gives the nation holding the prisoner vast, almost
boundless power over him, and it would seem odd that such power can
derive simply from the fact that the Taliban lacked uniforms or an
appropriate command and control system. It must also presuppose that
the Taliban army failed to conduct their operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war or, put more simply, that they were guilty
of war crimes.
Judge Ellis did in fact conclude that "the Taliban regularly targeted
civilian populations."2 5 Yet he cites as his only evidence two books not
about the conduct of the war or how the Taliban fought, but about how
the Taliban came to power. Such an approach has broad and sweeping
implications - probably every tyrant targets civilians in his drive to seize
and maintain power - and is alien to the very purposes of the Geneva
Conventions, which were intended, after all, to temper the treatment of
25. Id. at 558.
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prisoners. At the heart of the Geneva Conventions is a concern with the
way wars are fought, not how the governments at war obtained their
power. Under Section 2, lawful combatant status requires that the militia conduct its "operations" in accordance with the laws and customs of
war, and the word "operations" should have been construed with this
purpose in mind.
What moved Judge Ellis was not, I believe, his tortured and strikingly unpersuasive application of the Third Geneva Convention, but the
determination of the President that all those who resisted the United
States in Afghanistan were unlawful combatants. Judge Ellis acknowledged the President's decision, and said that it was entitled to great deference, though he was meticulous in declaring a limit to this deference.
As he put it, "Conclusive deference, which amounts to judicial abstention, is plainly inappropriate. 2 6 Yet I am left with the unmistakable
impression that Judge Ellis did exactly what he said he should not do.
He allowed the President's decision to serve as a substitute for his own
independent judgment. He treated the President's decision, much like
the Mobbs affidavit in Hamdi, as sufficient in itself to determine the
legality of the executive action. In doing so Judge Ellis in Lindh, much
like the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi, abdicated his responsibility under the
Constitution.
Such abdication has not been confined to the disposition of claims
by persons captured on the battlefield. In October 2002, the Third Circuit acquiesced in a new deportation program of the Attorney General
that was justified in terms of war needs, though this time it was simply
the ill-defined war on terrorism. The specific issue in this case - North
Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft27 - was whether newspapers or the
public or even family or friends would be given access to deportation
proceedings that had been designated by the Attorney General as "special interest" cases. The Attorney General feared that the access of the
the press or public might alert terrorists to the investigative tactics of the
government or betray the precise knowledge that the government
possessed.
The newspapers acknowledged that the right of access they claimed
was only a qualified right that can be defeated by a special showing. In
this context, acknowledging a right of access as a qualified right would
allow the government to make a showing before the presiding judge in
the deportation proceeding that special circumstances - including
national security concerns - warranted closure. The presiding judge
might of course agree with the government, but even if he or she did, the
26. Id. at 556-57.
27. 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 2215 (2003).
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judge would be assuming responsibility for the closure. The Third Circuit, however, took that decision away from the individual judge by
holding that the very designation of a national security interest defeated
the right of access. The blanket judgment of the Third Circuit endowed
the Attorney General with the power to close deportation proceedings
whenever he saw fit. There could be no particularized inquiry by a
judge into the national security justification for closure in a specific
case. Much like the Mobbs affidavit in Hamdi or the transfer of prisoners to Guantdnamo, the Attorney General's designation brought the reason of the law to an end.
The tide may yet turn - let's hope so. The Sixth Circuit has
reached a different conclusion than the Third Circuit on the question of
public access to "special interest" deportation proceedings.2 8 In the
months following the symposium in Coral Gables, the Supreme Court
agreed to review the Al Odah, Hamdi, and Padilla decisions.2 9 On
December 2, 2003, the day before filing its memorandum opposing the
grant of the writ of certiorari in the Hamdi case, the government
announced that it would, as a matter of discretion, allow the prisoner
access to counsel subject to appropriate security restrictions. 30 It pursued a similar strategy in the Padilla case, though in that instance it
made the announcement on February 11, 2004, when it filed its reply
brief in support of its application for the writ of certiorari. 3 1 After the
grant of the writ of certiorari in the Al Odah case, a panel of the Ninth
Circuit found that Guantd.namo was, in fact, within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States.3 2 Moreover, although it remains to be seen
what the capture of Saddam Hussein and the occupation of Iraq will
bring, it is noteworthy that the administration has not yet moved the
Iraqi prisoners it has captured to Guantinamo or chosen to designate
them en masse as unlawful combatants.
Still, the challenge to law in the post-September 11 era is unmistakable. The Iraq war stands as an affront to the international legal system,
and as is evident in the cases upon which I remarked, a number of good
and able judges have renounced their most basic responsibilities under
the Constitution. War always poses a challenge to law. It involves a
28. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
29. 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343) (Al Odah); 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 036696) (Hamdi); 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (No. 03-1027) (Padilla).
30. News Release, DoD Announces Detainee Allowed Access To Lawyer (Dec. 2, 2003),
http://www.defenselink.millreleases/2003/nr20031202-0717.html.
31. News Release, Padilla Allowed Access To Lawyer (February 11, 2004), http://www.de
fenselink.miilreleases/2004/nr20040211-0341 .html.
32. Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003), petitionfor cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3568
(U.S. Mar 03, 2004) (No. 03-1245).
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pursuit of interests through violence rather than reason and often excites
base fears and passions. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the most
shapeless of all wars - the war on terrorism - are not exceptions. A
practice of lawlessness has grown in the shadow of these wars, and it
poses a challenge for every law teacher.
The wars of the last two years have provoked protests and petitions,
and, like the war in Vietnam, the Iraq war is likely to become the subject
of national political contests. As citizens, we need to attend to such
contests and make our views known, but never in a way that relieves us
of our obligations as teachers of the law: We must stand within the law
and test the government's actions by the law. Such an endeavor may
lack the drama that the events of the day call for - it is detailed, patient
work, fully based on reason - yet it may be our most enduring
contribution.
Upon retiring from the Supreme Court, Thurgood Marshall was
asked by a reporter how he wished to be remembered. Marshall
answered with a spontaneity and immediacy that attested to the truth of
33
what he was about to say: "He did what he could with what he had."
He understood himself and the magnitude of his achievement, and provided a lesson for us all.

33. Excerpts from Marshall News Conference, L.A.
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